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1. OVERVIEW OF THE ASSESSMENT
 
This report, consisting of ten volumes, repre­
sents 
the results of the SEASAT Economic Assessment, as
 
completed through August 31, 
1975. The individual volumes
 
in this report are:
 
Volume I -
 Summary and Conclusions
 
Volume II -
 The SEASAT System Description and
 
Performance
 
Volume III - Offshore Oil and Natural Gas 
Industry 
-

Case Study and Generalization
 
Volume IV -
 Ocean Mining 
- Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volume V - Coastal Zones Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volume VI - Arctic Operations 
- Case Study and 
Generalization 
Volume VII - Marine Transportation 
- Case Study and 
Generalization 
Volume VIII - Ocean Fishing 
- Case Study and Generali­
zation 
Volume IX - Ports and Harbors - Case Study and Gen­
eralization 
Volume X - A Program for the Evaluation of Opera­
tional SEASAT System Costs. 
Each volume is self-contained and fully documents
 
the results in the study area corresponding to the title.
 
Table 1.1 describes the content of each volume 
to aid readers
 
in the selection of material that is 
of specific interest.
 
The SEASAT Economic Assessment began during Fis­
cal Year 1975. The objectives of the preliminary economic
 
assessment, conducted during Fiscal Year 1975, were 
to'identi­
fy the uses and users 
of the data that could be produced by
 
an operational SEASAT system and 
to provide preliminary esti­
mates of the benefits produced by the applications of this
 
Table 1.1: ContLt and Organizatlon of the rinal Report 
Volume No. Title Content 
I Summary and Conclusions A summary of benefits 
major findings of the 
and costs, and 
assessment. 
a statement of the 
TI The SEASAT System 
Description and Per-
formance 
A discussion of user requirements, and the system concepts 
to satisfy these requirements are presented along with a 
preliminary analysis of the costs of those systems. A 
description of the plan for the SEASAT data utility studies 
and a discussion of the preliminary results of the simula­
tion experiments conducted with the objective of quantifying 
the effects of SIIASAT data on numerical forecasting. 
III Offshore Oil and 
Natural Gas IndustLy-
Case Study and Gener-
alization 
The results of case studies which investigate the effects of 
forecast accuracy Oihoffshore operations in the North Sea, 
the Celtic Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico are reported. A 
methodology for generalizing the results to other geographic 
regions of offshore oil and natural gas exploration and de­
velopment is described along with an estimate of the world­
wide benefits. 
IV Ocean mining - Case 
Study and General-
ization 
The results of a study of the weather sensitive features of 
Lhe near shore and deep water ocean mining industries are 
described. Problems with the evaluation of economic benefits 
for the deep water ocean mining industry are attributed to 
the relative immaturity and highly proprietary nature of the 
industry. 
Table I. Content and Organization of the Final Report 
Volume No. Title 
V CoaStat ?onl s - Case 
Study and General-
Izatron 
VI Arctic Operations - Case 
Study and Generalization 
VII Marine Transportation-
Case Study and General-
ication 
VIII Ocea.i 
Study 
atJon 
Fishing - Case 
and Genteraliz-
IX Ports 
Study 
and 
and 
llarbors - Case 
Generaliation 
X A Program for the Evalu-
ation of Operational 
SEASAr System Costs 
I__n__ od )finl 

Content
 
The study and generaliration deal with the econoi c losses 
sustained in the U.S. coastal zones for the purpose of 
quantitatively establishing economic benefits as a conse­
quence of improving the predictive quality of destructive
 
phenomena in U.S. coastal zones. Improved prediction of 
hurricane landrall and improved experimental knowledge of 
hurricnes.eding are discussed.
 
he"hypoLeticai development and transportation of Arctic
oil and oiier reao',roes by ice breaking super tanker to 
the conti nental Past Coast are discussed. SCASAT data will 
contribute to a more effective transportation operation 
through the Arctic ice by reducing transportation costs as 
a consequence of reduced transit time per voyage. 
A discussion of the case studies of the potential use of 
SEASAT ocean condition data in the improved routing of dry 
cargo ships and taikers. Reusulting forecasts Could be 
useful in routing ships around storms, thereby reducing 
adverse weather damage, time loss, related operations costs, 
and occasiona] catastrophic losses. 
The potential application of S AgSAT data with regard to 
ocean fishdries is discussed in thils case study. Tracka ig 
fisli populations, indirect assistance in forecasting expected
populattons and assistance to fishing fleets in avoiding
 
costs incurred duo to adverse weather through improved ocean 
conditions forecasts were investigated. 
The case study and generalization quantify benefits made 
possible through improved weather forecasting resulting 
from the Integration of SDASAT data into local weather 
forecasts. The major source of avoidable economic losses 
from iadequate weather forecasting data was shown to be 
dependent ott local precipitation forecasting. 
A discussjot, of the SATIL 2 Program whicht was developed to 
assistii thie evaluation of the co9ts of operatioral SEASAT 
system alternative.. SATIL 2 enables the assessment of theOffocts of opesational requirements, reliabLlity, and time- W 
,hased uosts of alternative approaches 
4
 
data.* The preliminary economic assessment identified large
 
potential benefits from the 
use of SEASAT-produced data in the
 
-areas 
of Arctic operations, marine transportation, and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development.
 
During Fiscal Year 1976, the effort was directed to­
ward the confirmation of the benefit estimates in the three
 
previously identified major areas of use of SEASAT data, as
 
well as the estimation of benefits in additional application
 
areas. The confirmation of the benefit estimates in 
the three
 
major areas of application was accomplished by increasing both
 
the extent of user involvement and the depth of each of the
 
studies. Upon completion of this process of estimation, we have
 
concluded that substantial, firm benefits from the 
use of oper­
ational SEASAT data can be obtained in areas that are extensions
 
of current operations such as marine transportation and offshore
 
oil and natural gas exploration and development. Very large
 
potential benefits from the use 
of SEASAT data are possible in
 
an area of operations that is now 
in the planning or conceptual
 
stage, namely the transportation of oil, natural gas, and other
 
resources by surface ship in the Arctic regions. in this case,
 
the benefits 
are dependent upon the rate of development of the
 
resources that are believed to be in the Arctic regions, and
 
also dependent upon the 
choice of surface transportation over
 
pipelines as the means 
of moving these resources to the lower
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, ECON, Inc., October 1974.
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latitudes. Our studies have also identified that large
 
potential benefits may be possible from the use of SEASAT
 
data in support of ocean fishing operations. However, in
 
this case, the size of the sustainable yield of the ocean
 
remains an unanswered question; thus, a conservative view­
point concerning the size of the benefit should be adopted
 
until the process of biological replenishment is more
 
completely understood.
 
With the completion of this second year of the
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment, we conclude that the cumulative
 
gross benefits that may be obtained through the use of data
 
from an operational SEASAT system, to provide improved ocean
 
condition and weather forecasts is in the range of $859
 
million to $2709 million ($1975 at a 10 percent discount
 
rate) from civilian activities. These are gross benefits
 
that are attributable exclusively to the use of SEASAT data
 
products and do not include potential benefits from other
 
possible sources of weather and ocean forecasting that may
 
occur in the same period of time. The economic benefits
 
to U.S. military activities from an operational SEASAT sys­
tem are not included in these estimates. A separate study
 
of U.S. Navy applications has been conducted under the
 
sponsorship of the Navy Environmental Remote Sensing Coor­
dinating and Advisory Committee. The purpose of this Navy
 
study was to determine the stringency of satellite oceano­
graphic measurements necessary to achieve improvements in
 
REPRODUCIBILITY OF THA 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR 
6 
military mission effectiveness in areas where benefits are
 
known to exist.* It is currently planned that the Navy
 
will use SEASAT-A data to quantify benefits in military
 
applications areas. A one-time military benefit of approx­
imately $30 million will be obtained by SEASAT-A, by pro­
viding a measurement capability in support of the Depart­
ment of Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program.
 
Preliminary estimates have been made of the costs
 
of an operational SEASAT program that would be capable of
 
producing the data needed to obtain these benefits. The
 
hypothetical operational program used to model the costs of
 
an operational SEASAT system includes SEASAT-A, followed by
 
a number of developmental and operational demonstration
 
flights, with full operational capability commencing in
 
1985. The cost of the operational SEASAT system through
 
2000 is estimated to be about $753 million ($1975, 0 per­
cent discount rate) which is the equivalent of $272 million
 
($1975) at a 10 percent discount rate. It should be noted
 
that this cost does not include the costs of the program's
 
unique ground data handling equipment needed to process,
 
disseminate or utili'ze the information produced from SEASAT
 
data. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the net cumulative
 
SEASAT exclusive benefit stream (benefits less costs) as a
 
"Specifications of Stringency of Satellite Oceano­
graphic Measurements for Improvement of Navy Mission
 
Effectiveness." (Draft Report.) Navy Remote Sensing
 
Coordinating and Advisory Committee, May 1975.
 
6000 
5500 
SEASAT Program Cumulative Not Benefits
 
5000 1.- Benefits of SPASAT Exclusive
 
2. Costs do not include users costs
 
4500
 3. 	 All estimates in constant 1975 dollars
 
discounted to 1975
 
4000 
3500
 
3000
 
2500
 
2000
 
50 0
 
Inset: See Vi9ure 1.2 for detail
 
Oa 
o o250
 
0
 
iSoo
 
500 151 Discount Rate
 
076 20909 7 87 80 09 go 93 94 95 96 2000
 
IIt
taunchesI 
SrASAT-A Operational System 	 -Splocecraft ILaunIchs 
311122 	931124155 d1937 123191270113083 3469 34 142298 46111 537.I 177 
*C.Im ]tLv. Cost.s ald Dene~its at 
0% Discount R.t (il. ms $ 1975)
 
Figure 1.1 SEASAT Program Net Benefits, 1975-2060 
1000 
900 
SEASAT Program Cumulative Net Benefits 
1. Benefits of SBASAT Exclusive 
00 
700 
.2. 
3. 
COsts do not include users costs 
All estimates in constant 1975 dollars 
discounted to 1975 
600 0 
Soo 
400 -
g 
o 
0 0 
300 00 
0 
0 
0 
400 
-200 
-300 
-400 
1975 1976. 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 195 19Q,6 1987 1988 
0 
Figure 1.2 SEASAT Program Net Benefits 
(Inset from Figure 1.1) 
9 
function of the discount rate.
 
This volume describes the results of the case
 
studies of the economic benefits of improved forecasts
 
of ice, weather and ocean conditions to operations in the
 
Arctic.
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2. ICE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE ARCTIC NORTHWEST
 
PASSAGE CASE STUDY AND GENERALIZATION
 
2.1 Overview
 
This case study is developed on the hypothesis
 
that future significant finds of oil and gas and their
 
product-ion will be made in the North American Arctic regions.
 
It is assumed that some of the produced resources from
 
either the United States or Canadian Arctic will be trans­
ported by an ice-breaking Arctic super tanker fleet to the
 
continental East Coast, beginning in 1991 1992.
or 

The super tankers will have to transit the Arctic
 
Northwest Passage and in so doing, it is assumed that their
 
movement will be facilitated by SEASAT's observational data
 
that portrays leads through the ice of the passage.
 
SEASAT data will then contribute to a more effec­
tive transportation operation by reducing the transporta­
tion costs as a consequence of reduced transit time per
 
voyage.
 
The effectiveness improvement assumes that the
 
sea ice always contains leads or weaknesses that, if found,
 
can facilitate the tanker transits, and that SEASAT can
 
reliably contribute to identifying these leads or weak­
nesses for ship navigation purposes.
 
Depending on the actual contribution of SEASAT
 
to ice lead identification,, some fraction of the transit
 
time reduction savings is directly attributable to the
 
presence of SEASAT.
 
This application of SEASAT data is very special­
ized, both spatially and with respect to the location of
 
the resources and to the time of their availability.. It
 
is not therefore susceptible'to generalization.
 
The reduction in transportation costs are con­
sidered, in part, to be benefits to SEASAT. Although
 
Canada, the United States and the USSR have experimented
 
with ice-breaking operations in the Arctic, the total oper­
ation being considered is one that does not currently exist
 
except possibly in concept. The derived benefits are there­
fore conjectural, possibly speculative, although reasonable.
 
The content of the case study is therefore di­
rected to the establishment of the reasonableness of the
 
proposed operation, in terms of what is currently known
 
and the trends of that knowledge, as well as to the quan­
tificition of the benefits.
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3. SUMMARY
 
A certain undefined possibility exists that from
 
1992 to 2000* oil and gas from the Alaskan North Slope or
 
the more general North American Arctic region may be shipped
 
by tanker to the continental East Coast. This possibility
 
arises from assumptions that there will be a concentrated
 
effort to develop and produce Arctic oil by the oil concerns
 
of the United States and Canada to reestablish dwindling
 
reserves and satisfy demand in each country. It is also
 
assumed, based on the MARAD study,** that it will be more
 
economical and ecologically sound to operate a fleet of
 
tankers rather than construct a continental pipeline to
 
transport oil to the East Coast to offset the East Coast
 
demand for imported oil.
 
Accepting these assumptions requires that a fleet
 
of tankers, over the nine or ten years from 1990-2000, carry
 
resources via the Arctic Northwest Passage through the ice,
 
an activity requiring many transits of the passage over the
 
time period of interest.
 
SEASAT's Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is then
 
visualized as having the capability of providing appropriate
 
The year 2000 is considered to be the horizon for
 
the computation of SEASAT benefits. The life of
 
the extractable resources will probably extend
 
beyond this date.
 
ECON, Inc. MARAD: Five Forecast. Report prepared
 
for the Maritime Administration, Washington, D. C.,
 
February 1976.
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imagery data which will aid in facilitating the transit of
 
the tankers through the ice by providing navigational data
 
and prediction data, Other SEASAT sensors will also aid
 
by providing data for improved weather and ocean condition
 
forecasts.
 
As a consequence of this capability, the time to
 
transit will be reduced and operating tanker costs will be
 
reduced for each transit. The savings of operating costs,
 
subsequently described as benefits, are estimated to range
 
annually from $178 million to $646 million.
 
Based on judgmental estimates which attempt to
 
relate the SAR expected capability in 1990-2000 with the
 
requirements for ice navigation in that time, approximately
 
36 percent of this annual benefit is determined to be ex­
clusively attributable to the presence of SEASAT's orbiting
 
instrumentation and information dissemination system. Thus,
 
the annual benefit exclusive to SEASAT is estimated to range
 
from $64 million to $233 million.
 
The integrated benefit exclusive to SEASAT over
 
the time period of interest is then calculated as shown
 
below, as a function of discount rate.
 
Discount rate % 0 5 10 15
 
Integrated benefit
 
635 - 2147 248 - 770 96 - 288 39 - 114 
($ millions 1975)
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It is to be emphasized that the benefits developed
 
are purely hypothetical and concern both oil not yet com­
pletely discovered and an operation that is only a concept.
 
In general however, the assumptions are reasonable even
 
though hypothetical; and if the scenario for development
 
of the Arctic resources considered as the basis for this
 
report is reasonably accurate, the benefit estimates de­
rived are also reasonable.
 
Clearly, the actuality of the benefits depends
 
heavily on political, financial, economic, legal and eco­
logical constraints, the resolution of which cannot at this
 
time be foreseen. It is also not clear that tanker trans­
portation would be cheaper than that of a transcontinental
 
pipeline; however, that tradeoff is not considered to be a
 
part of this study.
 
The oil and gas under consideration for transpor­
tation are expensive resources because of the severe climate
 
of the environment in which they are situated. There is
 
a need to successfully develop technology and techniques
 
for operating in this environment to find and produce the
 
oil and gas and appropriate reserves necessary for economic­
ally viable production and transportation to the markets
 
that will be available,
 
It is estimated by US. Geological Survey (USGS)
 
and private industry that there are still significant oil
 
reserves in the continental United States or its offshore
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extensions although agreement on the amount is not generally
 
found. In Canada, the principle reserves appear to exist in
 
the Canadian Arctic, a fact which will provide impetus to
 
Canadian Arctic development.
 
Financing and risk, governmental participation,
 
taxation rules, etc, and the general national policies, that
 
may be evolved to stimulate investment in Arctic exploration,
 
can be expected to generate developmental movement if they
 
are favorable in terms of expected profit to the operators
 
involved. Today, the force of appropriate stimulus to full­
scale development is not apparent. Only tentative action
 
which gathers data as a basis for future development is
 
clearly observable.
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4. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND AND BASIS
 
4-.1 	 Introduction
 
The Case Study Background and Basis presents informa­
tion which illustrates the need to find new reserves of oil and
 
gas which also leaves in doubt the most advantageous regions
 
for prospecting as a result of estimation of these reserves.
 
The basis also presents the character of the ice
 
and its variation that must be transmitted by ice-breaking
 
tankers, and the relationship of SEASAT technology to facilita­
ting the problems of navigation for such tanker transits. An
 
estimate is also made of the exclusive contribution that SEASAT
 
may make to easing this difficult navigational problem, from
 
imagery provided by the SAR.
 
4.2 	 Oil and Gas Data
 
Oil data such as that shown in Figure 4.1 indicates a
 
decline in U.S. oil production, an increase in petroleum pro­
duct consumption and the current status of U.S. oil reserves.
 
Reserves in 1973, including 9.6 billion barrels in the Alaskan
 
North Slope, were 363' billion barrels, down by 1.7 billion
 
barrels from 1972, so that U.S. oil reserves are steadily
 
declining.
 
In 1973 the proved reserves of natural gas were
 
266 trillion cubic feet, down from 1972 by 12.7 trillion cubic
 
feet. These reserves include the 26 trillion cubic feet in
 
the Alaskan North Slope.
 
RfOsr'cs, Poduction
 
C R U O0 x . TATUR A 1, G A S 
--eaot. -c produtlon r, DroductionrJ.r..ry 1, 1974 _- 1973 -_--
3 
.--
- 1972--- cJa...ar, 1, 1974 . -1973 .1972 
6 9106B 106T I0 i/0 106T/Y 1031/0 10 'T/Y 0 cu ft 10Gsit w/ 106u f//y lo u r 'y 10Ic, ft/y 
N1OTHlMERICA 
Canada 9,424 1,274 1.790.0 88.7 1.535.0 75.7 1.424 50,299- 91,.707 3,241,400 81,0,3 2,1161,300

Unitcd Stnto. 35, 300 4,770 9,109.0 453.2 9,451.0 .66.1 7,070 249.950 647,157 22,054,000 640,374 22.097,00n

TOIAL 14,724 6,044 10,907.0 541.9 10,986.0 541.8 0,502 
 300,249 730.944 26,095,400 729,397 25,758,300
 
does not nclud. Arctxc gas
 
Sourco, IPE. 1974, p. 309 
Oil ProductLion
 
liORTHAUIERICA 
1940 1950 1955 1960 1964 1965 1966 1967 1960 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973­
Ca.wd0 
United Statos 
23.5--
1.21' 
3,707.4 
102.8 
79.6 
3.9 
1,407.1 
266.7 
354.7 
17.5 
6,006.7 
335.7 
525.6 
25.9 
7,054.6 
317.9 
752,4 
37.1 
7,635.1 
376,6 
801.4 
29.5 
7,004.1 
384.9 
070.4 
43.3 
8,295.2 
409.1 
1,107.0 
54.6 
i0,222.0 
504..1 
1.039.0 
51.2 
10,940.0 
540.0 
1,123.6 
55.4 
454.4 
,263.6 
62.3 
425.6 
1,350.0 
66.6 
9,529.0 
470.0 
1,535.0 
75.7 
9,451.0 
466.1 
1,790.0. 
00.7 
9,189.0 
451.2 
1973 prolmi ,'ry,-- par 1,000 b/d, p-a millio. t/y 
Source: IPR, 197.2, p. 306 
P'etroleum Product Consumption 
I1OrT7J'1flRICA 
1940 1950 1055 1060 1964 1905 1906 1967 1960 1969 1970 1971 19"32 1973' 
Canada 146' 324 540 041 1,050 1.142 1,205 1,251 1,348 l.410 1,525 1,531 -1,665 1,7557.2''' 16.0 27.0 41 4 51.0 56.3 59.4 61.7 66.5 70.0 75.2 75.5 82.1 06.6United Statos 
 3,655 5,700 7,216 91608 10,846 11,305 11,051 12,562 13,431 14,138 14,350 14,830 15,900 16,814
100.3 285.1 355.9 477.0 534.9 557.6 504.5 619.6 662.4 697.3 707.7 731.4 780.1' 029.3 
1973 ost Lted; -A 1,000 b/d; *-A million L/y 
So rc, IPE, 1974, p. 343 
Figure 4.1 Reserves and Production Summary
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The 1974 Internationa-l Petroleum Encyclopedia,
 
p. 142, estimates the ultimate recovery in the United States
 
of crude oil from proved reservoirs as well as depleted re­
servoirs at 136.2. billion barrels,
 
Continental U.S, exploration has not been very
 
successful in developing reserves. During 1972, for example,
 
new national discoveries only registered 123 million barrels
 
of oil. They contained probable ultimate reserves of 585 mil­
lion barrels of oil and condensate and 5 trillion cubic feet
 
of gas.* In 1972, 566 new field discoveries were made, an in­
crease of 30.5 percent from 1971 but only 19.4 percent were
 
significant, containing more than 1 million barrels of oil or
 
a gas equivalent (6 billion cubic feet).
 
The Canadian Petroleum Association reports similarly.
 
In 1973 proved reserve of crude oil and condensates declined
 
by 4.3 percent to 9.2 billion barrels. Crude oil reserves
 
dropped by 3.7 percent to 8 billion barrels, following declines
 
in 1970 of 0.7 percent and 2.6 percent in 1971. Similar de­
clines are indicated for Canadian natural gas.
 
Recent USGS estimates indicate that the U.S. conti­
nental shelf may contain 160 to 190 billion barrels of oil and
 
820 to 1110 trillion cubic feet of gas that may be recoverable,
 
one quarter of which is estimated to be in the offshore Atlantic.
 
Offshore California is estimated to contain from 6 to 19 billion
 
IPE, 1974, p. 154,
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barrels of oil and 12 to 38 trillion cubic feet of gas.*
 
Figure 4.2, U.S. Petroleum and Natural Gas Resources,
 
shows a composite breakdown by the USGS of these resources.
 
Future oil and gas demand in both the United States
 
and Canada is difficult to predict. This is particularly so
 
for the time period 1985-2000 under the impetus of policies of
 
self-sufficiency in energy which will develop energy alterna­
tives and seek to conserve petroleum products demand.
 
In the United States, demand has been stated as slow­
ing from 6-7 percent per annum to 2-4 percent per annum, and
 
in Canada, demand is expected to increase by at least 4.4 per­
cent per annum.**
 
C&nadian output cannot keep pace with these demand
 
estimates, and the United States needs new resource reserves
 
to provide security to its petroleum base.
 
Explorations to date in the Atlantic offshore and the
 
new Gulf Coast regions have not been successful, and the Cali­
fornia offshore explorations have been slowed by the actions
 
of those concerned with ecology.
 
Inspired by the Prudhoe Bay discovery in Alaska in
 
1968, United States and Canadian petroleum industries are con­
sequently moving to exploit the costly oil and gas reserves
 
estimated to exist in the North AMericqn Arctic. The Prudhoe
 
* 
Offshore, February 1975, pt 231.
 
*E IPE, 1974, p. 247.
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U.S. PTROLEUM AId NATURAL GAS RESOURCS 
2 
Io'hrado11thn.- to 'ater dep th of O etrs) S..v. I0U.0. GSlol~ia. - cvt 
Cruda Oil and Retural Sal Liquids (billians of barrels) 
PftoouaIoul 5Z l VrS pES00C0Z.*Undiscovered 
AREA 1972 Cusulativ. and 1972 r.lasured.. IrA icate nferred 0covIrbl 
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field has an estimated reserve of about 10 billion barrels and
 
its oil is destined for U.S. West Coast distribution subsequent
 
to 1977. So far, Canadian exploration in the Mackenzie Delta
 
and the Arctic Islands, in spite of a score of oil and gas
 
strikes, has not yielded a find as substantial as that of the
 
Prudhoe Bay.
 
Alaska's potentially recoverable reserves are estima­
ted at 40 billion barrels of oil and 300 trillion cubic feet
 
of gas. Geologists identify the exploratory Canadian Arctic
 
regions as the Baffin Shelf, the northern part of Hudson Bay,
 
the Northwest Territories, the Yukon mainland, the Beaufort
 
Basin and the Arctic Islands. Combined, these areas are be­
lieved to hold 72 billion barrels of oil and 530 trillion cubic
 
feet of gas with more than 80 percent allocated to the Beaufort
 
Basin and Arctic Islands. Thus, the prize in the Northern
 
American Arctic is some 112 billion barrels of oil and some 830
 
trillion cubic feet of gas which has to be found and produced.*
 
A great deal of costly and time-consuming work re­
mains to be done, however, in exploration, development and trans­
portation before any of these products can be marketed. The
 
rapidity and the extent with which access to these resources can
 
be achieved depends on technology, manpower availability, drill­
ing rig availability, costs, prices, capital, government policies
 
and influences exerted with respect to pollution, ecology and
 
IPE, 1974, p. 242.
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preservation of the natural environment.
 
Some opinions of one expert* in Arctic offshore oil
 
activities are quoted below.** These opinions indicate times
 
for maximum oil production in shallow waters from 8 to 12 years,
 
in deeper waters from 16 to 21 years, all using the Prudhoe Bay
 
region as an operating base. More remote regions would have
 
longer timetables.
 
The near shore area up to about 60 feet of water,
 
Hudson said, offers opportunity for early development because
 
a large portion can be directionally drilled from shore or
 
from existing islands using proven, Arctic, dry land drilling
 
techniques.
 
Shallow water areas that are out of reach of shore­
based directional drilling could be drilled within three years,
 
Hudson said, using technology gained from actual offshore in­
stallations in Canada and Alaska's Cook Inlet, and from ongoing
 
research. According to Hudson, an estimated timetable 
for de­
veloping oil production in shallow water in the vicinity of an
 
existing oil field such as Prudhoe Bay, with logistic support
 
facilities and oil transportation system, will follow.
 
4.2.1 Probable Schedule
 
The following schedule outlines the basic development
 
stages which the oil industry will most probably adhere to 
in
 
Hudson, .Thomas A., a specialist in Arctic on and offshore
 
R&D engineering.
 
w*
 
Offshore, March 1975, pp. 54, 56.
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their efforts toward maximum oil production:
 
Probable Schedule for Shallow Water
 
* 	 Environmental Impact Statement
 
develop data, hold hearings and
 
prepare report one 
year
 
e Lease Bids
 
geophysical, publicize, evaluations one year
 
a 	 Exploratory Drilling-System-Design
 
and Fabrication
 
now
 
from onshore and existing islands available
 
from offshore three years
 
* 	 Exploratory Drilling two years
 
design, fabricate and install
 
from onshore 
 one year
 
from offshore two years
 
* 	 Development Drilling
 
develop first oil production one year
 
develop maximum oil production three years
 
According to this plan for oil development, it will
 
be six to ten years before the first oil is produced and eight
 
to 12 years until maximum oil production is accomplished.
 
Probable Schedule for Deeper Water--60 to 200 Feet
 
* 	 Research and Development
 
five to
 
environmental, sea, ice, soils, etc. ten years
 
* 	 Environmental Impact Statement
 
develop data, hold hearings and
 
prepare report 
 one year
 
* 	 Exploratory Drilling-System-Design
 
and Fabrication three years
 
* 	 Exploratory Drilling two years
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* 	 Development and Production Structure
 
design, fabricate and install 
 two years
 
a Development Drilling
 
to 
develop first oil production one year

to develop maximum oil production three years
 
The total time anticipated to produce the first oil
 
is 14 to 19 years and 6 to 
21 	years for maximum oil production.
 
Hudson stressed that estimated times are approximate
 
and will most 
likely be longer rather than shorter. He said,
 
discoveries in Arctic 
areas remote from Prudhoe Bay would re­
quire several more years beyond that shown in order to 
research,
 
engineer and build 
a crude oil transportation system utilizing
 
ice-breaking techniques 
or 
under ice transport technology.
 
Much research remains to be done to prepare the way
 
for the move into offshore Arctic waters. 
 Hudson said, the
 
main gaps in Arctic offshore knowledge relate to ice and
sea 

subsea soil properties.
 
Describing 
sea ice as the biggest force on off­an 

shore structure, Hudson 
said, its strength depends on several
 
factors such as temperature, salinity and load rate and that
 
these are not related to one another. Additionally, sea ice
 
exists 
in many different shapes and sizes including normal 
one­
year sheet ice, 12 
feet thick and greater, pack ice, pressure
 
ridges and ice islands.
 
Specific research, Hudson added, should be directed
 
to behavior, ,motion and forms of sea 
ice in areas of offshore.
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interest. Continuing work with structural models in ice should
 
be performed in the laboratory and eventually should be per­
formed with larger models in the field. With data from these
 
experiments, mathematical models can be prepared which could be
 
utilized to predict ice forces for other Arctic locations,
 
water depths or structure configurations.
 
4.2,2 Other Factors Affecting the Schedule
 
of Exploration and Development
 
Regarding the sea floor, Hudson said, permafrost
 
represents the largest unknown. He said, it is evident that
 
it does exist in shallow waters and perhaps exists in deeper
 
waters. More research is necessary in deeper waters to de­
termine where it exists and what its properties are, also, what
 
happens if permafrost thaws. Also, research is needed to de­
velop a tool to find and map permafrost.
 
Of the industry's present capability, Hudson said, it
 
has been proven to build artificial islands in shallow water
 
but that depth limit for such islands is around 60 feet.
 
Depending on the character of the sea ice, explora­
tory drilling can also be done from the ice sheet itself. Off
 
Prudhoe Bay, he said, is probably limited to shallow water under
 
60 feet deep.
 
Exploratory drilling can also be done from a concrete
 
or steel barge, strengthened and with sides sloped for ice re­
sistance. The barge would be ballasted down to rest on the
 
ocean floor. Piling would be installed to hold the barge agaiist
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lateral forces. This concept is probably economical now, Hudson
 
said, for very shallow water, 10 to 20 feet deep. While the
 
concept is not proven, it is within the present design capabil­
ity, he added.
 
Steel or concrete fabricated gravity structures or
 
pile supported structures are also within present design capa­
bility though not yet proven by actual practice- Present de­
sign capability is probably limited to about 60 feet of water.
 
Hudson said the structures probably have sloped sides like a
 
cone or a pyramid or they could be of the monopod type. They
 
would have an advantage in exploratory drilling over filled
 
islands because of their mobility. Though not yet proven, he
 
said, such concepts are within present day design capability.
 
Seasonal methods such as ice-strengthened floating
 
drilling vessels are also within the capability of present
 
technology. Their limitations are economic and relate to de­
gree of ice coverage rather than water depth.
 
Hudson estimated that the industry could extend its
 
design capability to 100 feet of water after about five years
 
and to 200 feet after ten years of active research and develop­
ment. The estimate assumes simultaneous drilling on shallow
 
water leases.
 
Drilling in the Beaufort Sea has been stated as rep­
resenting a reasonable gamble using present day technology.
 
This sea and adjacent coastal regions are thought to contain
 
10 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 75 trillion cubic
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feet of gas. Subsequent to a $5 million environmental study,
 
drilling will start in 
summer 1976 using two drillships, 80
 
percent financed by the industry, the remainder by the federal
 
government. 
 Even with the most ideal exploratory progress re­
sults are not contemplated until 1985. Estimates of costs for
 
a specialized drilling unit are 
about $70 million and' the cost
 
of a well at $10 million for four to five times the cost of
 
land-based Arctic exploration.*
 
If exploration in shallow water is more 
likely in
 
nine years (1976-1985), 
rather than three years, production
 
would not 
come into being until after 14 to 18 years, i.e.,
 
1990 to 1994. 
 The Beaufort Sea region of exploration is shown
 
on the accompanying map of Alaska (Figure 4.3).
 
Imperial Oils' discovery (Ivik J26) is one of three
 
fields found with total reserves in excess 
of 5 billion barrels,
 
a volume-regarded as an 
absolute minimum for development and
 
transportation to market from the Arctic.** For natural gas.
 
the economic discovery threshold is about 30 trillion cubic
 
feet.
 
Oil and gas transportation from the Arctic regions
 
have undergone considerable study with the Alyeska project now
 
nearing completion from Prudhoe Bay. Transportation methods
 
are by pipeline proposals briefly summarized in the following
 
paragraphs.
 
Offshore, March 1975, pp. 128, 130.
 
Offshore, February 1975, p. 208.
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Engineering and environmental studies have yet to
 
turn up any technical problems that would bar laying big-inch
 
pipelines to move Arctic oil and gas to markets in Canada and
 
the United States.
 
That is the belief of sponsors of the studies for
 
land and marine pipeline projects on the North Slope, the
 
Mackenzie Delta and in the Arctic Islands. Five pipelines from
 
the Arctic region are proposed by U.S. and Canadian companies
 
at a cost of more than $20 billion. The projects are planned
 
by:
 
M Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a seven-company
 
consortium which in January 1974 won final
 
approval from the U.S. government for a 789-mile,
 
48-inch, $5 billion crude oil line from Prudhoe
 
Bay south, to Alaska's ice-free port of Valdez.
 
Tanker shipments from Valdez to the Lower 48 West
 
Coast are planned in 1977.
 
* El Paso Natural Gas Company, conducting studies
 
for a natural gas line from Prudhoe Bay field to
 
the southern coast of Alaska where gas would be
 
liquefied for tanker shipment to the Lower 48.
 
Line construction in the $3 billion pro.ject would
 
be timed to follow completion of the Alyeska system.
 
1
IPE, 1974, p. 245.
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D 	Canadian Arctic Gas Study Ltd. (Cagsl), a 27­
member consortium planning a $5.5 billion gas line
 
from Prudhoe Bay and the Mackenzie Delta to Monchy,
 
Saskatchewan, via the Mackenzie River Valley.
 
a Mackenzie Valley Pipe Line Research Ltd., 
a con­
sortium of 12 companies proposing $3.4. billion
a 

crude oil line that roughly parallels the Cagsl,
 
route. The line would connect at Edmonton, Alberta
 
with existing systems of Interprovincial Pipe Line
 
Company and Trans Mountain Oil Pipe Line Company
 
Ltd.
 
M 	 Polar Gas Project, a six-company group that wants
 
to lay a $5 billion gas line from -the Arctic
 
Islands down either side of Hudson Bay to south­
eastern Canada.
 
In addition, the U.S. Navy wants to develop oil 
re­
serves it holds in Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 in northern
 
Alaska and lay its own pipeline system to the state's southern
 
shore. This proposal has not yet reached the firm stage and
 
requires funding by Congress for exploratory drilling.
 
Oil industry officials believe it is likely that the
 
Mackenzie Valley crude line proposal will be deferred for many
 
years. They base this view on preference for the Alyeska pro­
posal by operators at Prudhoe Bay, the field that holds the
 
vast majority of the Arctic's proved oil reserves.
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El Paso and Cagsl were competing for Prudhoe Bay gas
 
supplies. It appeared certain that if El 
Paso wins, the Cagsl
 
project would be delayed several years until 
the Mackenzie
 
Delta develops enough reserves 
to support a big-inch system on
 
its own.
 
A map of the Arctic Islands is shown in Figure 4.4.
 
The Prudhoe Bay production is planned at 0.6 million
 
barrels per day by July 
or August 1977, increasing in capacity
 
to 
1.2 million barrels per day by November 1977 with an ulti­
mate capacity of 2 million barrels per day but 
a throughput of
 
1.6 to 1.7 million barrels per day achieved by 1978. The pipe­
line is 800 miles 
long from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez. in 1968 
its cost was estimated at $900 million. Cost to completion is 
currently set at $5.982 billion. It has been estimated that by 
2002 the estimated 10 billion barrels of reserve will be consumed. 
There is currently doubt that the U.S. 
West Coast
 
demand can 
absorb the expected maximum production from Prudhoe
 
Bay which may cause production to be slowed 
or for alternate
 
distribution to be introduced.
 
Reserve estimates that are recoverable are the sub­
ject of frequent revision largely as 
the basis for planning for
 
energy independence.** The following data is extracted from
 
"The Economic Value of 
Ocean Resources to the United States,"
 
Committee on Commerce, December 1974.
 
Offshore, May 1975, p. 194.
 
** See also IPE, 1975.
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Up to the end of 1972 some 115 million-barrels of oil
 
and nearly 440 trillion cbic feet of natural gas have been
 
produced in the United States, approximately 5 percent of each
 
having come from offshore areas.
 
If those "recoverable" sources, undiscovered but be­
lieved to exist, are omitted, only 70 to 90 billion barrels of
 
oil and 400 to 500 trillion cubic feet of gas are left to be pro­
duced in the United States, with 10 to 14 billion barrels of oil
 
and 71 to 93 trillion cubic feet of gas offshore. These are the
 
latest USGS estimates substantially reduced, particularly for
 
offshore, from earlier estimates. The USGS also states, there
 
are more undiscovered resources onshore than offshore but that
 
offshore resource reserve share will grow as exploration gets
 
underway. These estimates extend out to 200 meters of water.
 
There is a deliberate program to accelerate federal
 
offshore leasing but production in the immediate future will be
 
restrained by shortages of manpower, drilling vessels and equip­
ment.
 
In 1972 the National Petroleum Council (NPC) made a
 
detailed projection of production Eaking into account drilling
 
rates, finding rates, Alaskan North Slope production and return
 
on investment. These projections are shown below:
 
11.1 9.6 - 10.2 8,9 - 13.6 10.4 - 15.5 nillionOil 

barrels/day
 
Gas 22.3 21.8 - 23.7 17.3 - 26.1 15. - 31.9 	 trillion
 
cubic feet
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4.3 
This projection used offshore resource estimates well
 
beyond the latest USGS revision quoted above.
 
The Bureau of Mines in 1973 offered a projection for
 
offshore production as follows;
 
1970 base 588 million barrels
 
1985 962 million barrels
 
These projections have been extended by the staff of
 
the Assistant Secretary of Interior 
for Mineral Resources, as
 
follows:
 
Year % of U.S. Total Millions of Barrels
 
1970 16.7
 
1973 19.5
 
1985 23.6
 
2000 29.9 
 1045
 
Similar projections are made for natural gas produc­
tion but are not reported here. The report also suggests that
 
it is doubtful that the long-term relative price of either gas
 
or 
oil will rise much above the values set in 1974. Thus, the
 
report sets a reasonable long-term estimate for oil 
at $10 per
 
barrel and for natural gas at $0.80 per cubic foot.
 
Factors in the Transportation of Arctic Oil and
 
Gas by Surface Ship
 
This section provides descriptive information about
 
ice conditions along various possible shipping routes by
 
which oil and gas can be transported from Canadian Arctic
 
sources. Figure 4.5 
shows the general placement of the trans­
it being considered.
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The nature and frequency of ice reconnaissance and
 
weather information requirements varies considerably in dif­
ferent parts of the Arctic. The benefit obtained from daily
 
ice reconnaissance depends on destination or starting point
 
within the Arctic, the time of year, the type of ship being
 
used and the rapidity of change of 'ice conditions along the
 
route.
 
An increase in Arctic inbound shipping can be expec­
ted if offshore activity increases. Massive tonnages of pipe
 
will have to be shipped into the Arctic if any of the proposed
 
major oil or gas pipelines are built. Of additional signifi­
cance from both an economic and environmental viewpoint, is
 
the possibility of shipment of resources out of the Arctic.
 
This section will consider the ice conditions likely
 
to be encountered at various times of the year by ship
 
transits from Canadian offshore areas from which petroleum
 
might be shipped eastward. They are considered briefly to
 
gain some insight into the types of ships that may be used,
 
the type of ice information needed and the reduction in de­
lays that may be achieved through improved ice forecisting.
 
Maps relating to the regions involved appear earlier in the
 
text.
 
Arctic Islands oil and gas could be transported by
 
pipeline to Devon or Ellesmere Islands and from there by surface
 
ship to East Coast markets. Possible departure points include
 
Jones Sound (south coast of Ellesmere) and Radstock Bay (good
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conditions for a pipeline to here) on Devon Island. Alterna­
tively, more powerful surface ships could-go directly to the
 
.Sverdrup Basin and transport petroleum from one or more of
 
the islands. The best oil prospect Panarctic has found in
 
seven years (and 100 wells) of active exploration in the
 
Islands is at Cameron Island. Although the initial strike
 
there flowed only 500 barrels per day, Panarctic is hoping for
 
about 500 million barrels of proven reserves on the island.
 
Panarctic officials are considering year-round tanker shipping
 
directly from Cameron Island (see Figure 4.4), Liquified
 
natural has could also be transported by tanker either from
 
Devon Island or from Drake Point on Melville Island where
 
proven reserves are already more than 5 trillion cubic feet.
 
Beaufort Sea oil could be shipped by ice-breaking tanker from
 
a terminal, e.g., Hershel Island in the Beaufort Sea, through
 
the Northwest Passage to East Coast ports. Descriptions of
 
ice conditions faced by ships transitting the Arctic passage
 
are given below, from different departure regions.
 
4.3.1 Jones Sound and Radstock Bay
 
Shipping from the south coast of Devon or Ellesmere
 
Islands involves transit through Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.
 
These water bodies are subject to strong winds and current.
 
Ice conditions are very dynamic year-round and the ice reacts
 
quickly to wind changes. From hour-to-hour conditions can be
 
such as to create leads which a ship could take advantage of
 
or create pressure points hindering a ship's progress. The May
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1970 voyage of the- Manhattan was beset for days near Disco
 
Island (off the Greenland coast) by ice driven across the bay
 
-bya northwest wind and held onto the Greenland coast under
 
pressure. For about nine months of the year in Baffin Bay
 
there is enough ice that under certain conditions of wind and
 
current would present problems for a ship. Strong winds over
 
an extended period of time can create ice pressure forcing all
 
movement by shipping to stop. The driving pack, under pressure
 
on an exposed coast, can sweep a ship along with it and deposit
 
her on the shore. Although first-year ice predominates in
 
Baffin Bay, there may also be floes 15 or more feet thick.
 
High pressure fields and heavy ridging (10 per nautical mile)
 
is possible because of the moving ice, strong winds, large
 
water bodies and hence, long fetches.
 
Optimum route selection will involve making use of
 
open areas, leads, flaws and other weak points or disconti­
nuities in the ice. Optimum transit speeds can be maintained
 
by a knowledge of iceberg distribution on route. Large tankers
 
such as the Manhattan have great strength but sacrifice some­
thing in maneuverability. in order to maintain acceptable
 
speeds and keep on schedule, particularly under the conditions
 
of low visibility (fog) which are frequent along this route,
 
bulk carriers will have to have a positive knowledge of what
 
lies ahead. In her 1969 Arctic voyage, the Manhattan was pre­
ceeded in her voyage through the iceberg-infested waters of
 
Baffin Bay by the ice-breaker John A. MacDonald which delineated
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a path for her to follow. At various stages no point on the
 
horizon was visible because of icebergs.
 
Since wind has a far greater effect on the movement
 
of ice than currents, clearly, a reliable forecast combined
 
with knowledge of present ice conditions could indicate ice
 
movement and possible pressure points and would be of great
 
value in routing.
 
4.3.2 Beaufort Sea (Hershel Island)
 
Shipment of Beaufort Sea oil to eastern markets in­
volves use of the Northwest Passage. Conditions are highly
 
variable along this route. East of Resolute Island, the ice
 
is churning year-round and the area is quite sensitive to
 
change--frequent ice surveillance is, therefore, required
 
all year. Ice conditions in Lancaster Sound have similarities
 
with those of Baffin Bay. Icebergs drift in in the summer
 
and leads and pressure ridges (with frequency about 10 per
 
nautical mile) are formed in the winter.
 
West of Resolute through Prince of Wales Strait,
 
from February to May, reported ice information indicates the
 
likelihood of small change during the period. This should
 
be qualified, however, by noting that the impact of tanker
 
traffic could convert a relatively static situation into a
 
chaotic one (the effect is not known at the present time).
 
However, during the Manhattan voyage when there was pressure
 
on the ice, the water wake behind the ship disappeared with­
in 100 yards of the ship so there was no visible evidence of
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her passing. The ice in Viscount Melville Sound is the
 
heaviest along the Northwest Passage route. Ridge frequency
 
is 15 to 20 per nautical mile and ridge heights of 20 or more
 
feet are found. Significant ice movement can be expected in
 
this area from July through December. In addition to pro­
viding information on distribution and movement of ice during
 
the summer, ice reconnaissance would show the pattern of
 
freeze-up in the fall and the impending pattern of breakup
 
itself. For about seven months of the year frequent surveil­
lance will be required in this area. During the breakup per­
iod, old ice moves down from the'north in floes 12 to 15 feet
 
thick. These may plug the entrance to Prince of Wales Strait.
 
This condition and an open route through M'Clure Strait could
 
sometimes make it the preferred passage in, September and
 
October. After freeze-up, when new ice surrounds multi-year
 
ice, it is desirable to distinguish between them. The multi­
year ice could be 12 feet thick and first-year ice 3 feet.
 
In addition, it is essential to identify ice island fragments
 
which may rise a few feet above the surrounding ice but can
 
be extremely thick, e.g., 12 feet above and 120 feet below.
 
For ships operating in the Arctic, the shortest route is fre­
quently not the fastest and if a ship has knowledge of old
 
ice and ice islands ahead, it can detour or go a completely
 
different route with considerable time savings. Frequency,
 
size and orientation to track pressure ridges are all
 
important, and optimum route selection can save time. Mo­
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mentum is important and if a ship cannot maintain her momen­
tum in passing through a high density region of pressure
 
.ridges, she may be stopped and require assistance.
 
The Beaufort Sea has dynamic year-round ice condi­
tions like Baffin Bay. Here, changes in wind velocity and
 
direction have a dramatic and extremely rapid influence on
 
ice conditions. Ridging is severe and frequent (approxi­
mately 15 per nautical mile). A heavy shear ridge can exist
 
between the shorefast ice and the moving Beaufort Sea ice.
 
Frequent ice forecasting is required for year-round activity
 
in this area. One risk of damage to ships in the Arctic
 
comes from running aground. Although this is most likely to
 
occur in uncharted waters, a driving pack under pressure
 
could drive a ship aground. Ice and weather forecasting will
 
be important in shallow water areas, particularly near a
 
terminal (e.g., Hershel Island in the Beaufort Sea) when the
 
ship wants to stay in a narrow channel to get into refuge.
 
Mass and momentum are extremely effective in ice
 
so that 150, 000 to 250,000 dwt vessels are expected to be
 
used if petroleum is shipped out of the Arctic. They might
 
travel in pairs but this creates scheduling problems at
 
loading terminals. On the Manhattan voyage there were 25
 
occasions when she required assistance of her ice-breaker
 
escorts. Although it was 
felt that most of these occasions
 
sould have been avoided with a more powerful ship, it was
 
also felt that skillful shiphandling together with excellent
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4.4 
ice forecasting will be required for efficient year-round
 
navigation. In addition to besetments in hummocked old ice
 
floes, the Manhattan experienced difficulty in the Beaufort
 
Sea in an area where heavy snow turned the ice into a heavy
 
sludgy consistency. Also pancake ice in one area, not more
 
than 10 inches thick, stuck to the ship and piled up ahead
 
of her until it brought her to a standstill. Ice-breaker
 
assistance was required.
 
Remote Sensing Benefits to Arctic Oil
 
and Gas Transport
 
The description of ice conditions to be encountered
 
by ships transporting reserves out of the Arctic has been
 
given to indicate, the utility%of ice forecasting. It is
 
difficult to estimate the expected improvement in operational
 
efficiency that could result as this varies with the time of
 
year and design of ship. Clearly, a Class 6 ice-breaking
 
tanker will experience more difficulty in winter in passing
 
from Lancaster Sound through Baffin Bay than a Class 8 (or 10)
 
tanker coming from Hershel Island or Cameron Island and built
 
to traverse the heavy ice of Viscount Melville Sound. On the
 
average, it has been estimated, however, that ice forecasting
 
provided by remote sensing could save two to three days (per
 
voyage) for ships coming from the Beaufort Sea (three days
 
for half the year when conditions are very dynamic), two days
 
for ships coming from Cameron Island or Ellef Ringnes since
 
there are choices of routes possible, and one day for ships
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coming from Jones Sound and the south coast of Ellesmere.
 
These savings have been discussed with Captain T. C. Pullen
 
-who was on board the Manhattan. It is estimated that a SEASAT
 
or equivalent operational satellite system giving extent and
 
,ovement of ice, leads, ice islands and icebergs 
(with coverage
 
twice per day) would achieve about 75 percent of these benefits
 
under all weather conditions. Some information on pressure
 
ridges, ice age and type and 
snow is also almost certain but
 
uncertainties about the quality of information in these 
areas
 
will only be resolved when satellite data becomes available.
 
Further studies are in progress to relate delay times to ice
 
conditions and to ship design.
 
As the benefits derived from remote sensing depend
 
on the shipping traffic, the values are in doubt until decisions
 
regarding the mode of transportation are made. It is probable
 
that eastern offshore oil and gas (in liquefied form) will be
 
transported by surface ship to East Coast markets. is
It 

possible that Arctic Islands oil will 
also be transported by
 
surface tanker. Less attractive but also possible is the trans­
port of liquefied natural gas from the Arctic Islands.
 
Transportation of oil from the Beaufort Sea is also
 
a possibility but less likely is view of the multi-year ice
 
conditions. The severity of the risk of oil spills 
to the
 
delicate Arctic ecology has prompted many to dismiss surface
 
shipping as a possible mode of transport.
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4.4.1 	 Applicability of SEASAT Instruments
 
to Ice Reconnaissance
 
SEASAT-A will not be able to observe the entire
 
Northwest Passage because of its 108-degree orbit inclination.
 
Its northernmost coverage reaches to about 72' N latitude.
 
This will allow it to see the entire shear zone along the north­
ern coast of Alaska. The regular synoptic observation of ice
 
information from this area will be of great value of exploratory
 
drilling and supply shipping, The SEASAT operational system
 
will likely be in operation well before the expected opening
 
of the Northwest Passage. However, in contrast to the 720 N
 
latitude coverage of SEASAT-A, tke near polar orbit of an
 
operational SEASAT will provide coverage up to at least 76 de­
grees and will be useful for navigation along this entire Arctic
 
Islands region, and thereby, considerably enhance the value of
 
SEASAT for general ice reconnaissance.
 
All the SEASAT instruments have possible applica­
tions to the remote observation of ice. only one, however,
 
has good enough resolution to be of definite utility for
 
routing ships: this is the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).
 
Many investigators have experimented with airborne SARs
 
for remote sensing of ice. The sum of their experience in­
dicates that this instrument has great potential for gather­
ing many types of ice information. There is no question that
 
SAR images contain valuable qualitative information about ice.
 
So far, however, few quantitative results have been obtained.
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For example, it is known that ice surface roughness is cor­
related with image brightness but no specific numerical re­
lationship has yet been determined for any particular radar.
 
It is expected that, during the next several years, methods
 
for quantizing and calibrating the data can be developed.
 
Even at the present state-of-the-art, much valuable inform­
ation is available from SAR imagery.
 
Optical imagery may contain more detailed information
 
about ice than -radar but Arctic weather conditions demand a
 
sensor which can penetrate cloud cover. The SAR's abilitv to
 
see through clouds and even light precipitation makes it
 
ideally suited to the Arctic. This means that SEASAT has
 
a unique capability for Arctic ice reconnaissance.
 
Table 4.1 shows a list of ice descriptors needed
 
for good ice forecasting and navigation. It can be seen
 
from the second column that while SEASAT probably cannot
 
supply every piece of information that an Arctic ship captain
 
would desire, it certainly can supply him with many facts
 
which will be of great assistance.
 
Knowing the locations and orientations of leads
 
(open water areas), for example, can greatly reduce ship
 
travel times. Clearly, sailing along a lead is preferable
 
to breaking ice. In addition to this, orientation and spac­
ing of leads show the "grain" of the ice pack and so indicate
 
the easiest direction of passage, even if the ship track is
 
not actually through open water.
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Table 4.1 Ice Characteristics Needed for Forecasting and
 
Navigation
 
Is SEASAT
 
Ice Description Applicable? Comments
 
Leads are visible on SAR.
 
Leads (open water) yes Ships should sail in them
 
or parallel to them.
 
Ice Surface Knowing these parameters
 
Roughness yes together with wind velocity,
 
ice movement can be
 
predicted. Surface rough­
ness correlates well with
 
SAR image brightness.
Ice Internal Strain yes Strain is measurable by
 
comparing time-sequential
 
SAR images. When good
 
models are developed bottom
 
Ice Bottom roughness may not be
 
Roughness no required.
 
There is no obvious way to
 
measure thickness directly

Ice Thickness indirectly 	 with SEASAT. Some
 
information is available
 
indirectly.
 
Pressure Ridges 	 These are belts of highly
 
deformed ice which are hard
 
Oaini yes to break through. SAR
 
Spacing yes imagery shows their
 
orientation and spacing.
 
Distribution of Detectable from SAR images.
 
Multi-year v's. yes Multi-year ice is much
 
First-year Ice harder to sail through than
 
first-year ice.
 
Snow Depth over This affects the coefficient
 
Ice doubtful of friction between ice and
 
ship side.
 
Iceberg Locations yes 	 Visible on SAR images.
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Leads are clearly visible as black regions on an
 
SAR image because the relatively smooth surface of water has
 
Very low specular reflectivity.
 
At the wavelengths used by SEASAT's sensors, radia­
tion is rapidly attenuated as it penetrates sea ice. Virtually
 
all the return is from the top surface of the ice. Therefore,
 
there does not appear to be any way to measure ice thickness
 
directly using SEASAT's instruments, Thickness information
 
can be obtained indirectly, however. Por example, first-year
 
ice is thinner than multi-year ice, and these two types of
 
ice can be distinguished by their differing surface roughness.
 
gives much less
First-year ice is relatively smooth, and thus, 

radar return than the rough, broken surface of multi-year ice.
 
Multi-year ice, besides being thicker than first-year ice, is
 
very tough and difficult to break through. It follows that
 
differentiating between these two types of ice is very
 
important for navigation.
 
Pressure ridges are belts of highly deformed ice formed
 
by internal stresses in the ice. Along pressure ridges, ice
 
extends upward in a high "sail" and down in a deep "keel";
 
overall pressure ridge heights of 50 feet .are not uncommon and
 
150-foot ridges have been encountered. Horizontal thickness
 
can be 5 to 10 miles and lengths can extend to 100 miles or
 
more. Obviously, this kind of ice is to be avoided. SEASAT
 
data is useful since pressure ridges show up as bright lines on
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SAR images. The vertical thickness cannot be measured but
 
locations and orientations are definitely available.
 
The depth of snow lying on top of the ice affects the
 
coefficient of friction between the ice and the hull of a ship
 
passing through it. Thus, knowledge of snow depth would help
 
in predicting the difficulty of passage along a given route.
 
Unfortunately, SEASAT probably cannot supply this information.
 
Icebergs are visible on SAR imagery. The requirements
 
for monitoring and predicting the movement of icebergs was
 
investigated in an earlier SEASAT applications case study by
 
Batelle.* This stndy concerned the utility of SEASAT to the
 
U.S. Coast Guard in the conduct of its International Ice
 
Patrol Program. As indicated in this earlier study, SEASAT
 
should make it possible to track icebergs and predict their
 
movements so that ships can be routed away from them.
 
The models necessary to forecast the movement of ice
 
are not fully developed nor in operational use yet. It appears
 
that the important parameters of such forecasting models are
 
the wind velocity, the ice top surface roughness, bottom sur­
face roughness and internal strain, Top surface roughness
 
determines the driving force exerted on the ice by the wind.
 
Bottom surface roughness affects the drag force created as the
 
ice moves through the water. Internal strain is important be­
cause part of the applied forces will go toward making the pack
 
SEASAT Economic Assessment,. October 1974, 
ppt 7-60t
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converge or diverge rather than drift as a whole. SEASAT data
 
should accelerate the arduous process of developing and cali­
brating such a model.
 
Ice surface roughness should be measurable since it
 
is the parameter which determines SAR image brightness. The
 
internal strain in the ice should be obtainable by measuring
 
the relative movement of features on SAR images. When two
 
features move toward one another, for example, there is a
 
compressive strain developing in the region between them.
 
The roughness of the ice bottom surface will not be measure­
able from SEASAT. However, when all the factors affecting
 
ice movement become fully understood, it may be that fore­
casts 
can be made without knowing this parameter.
 
To summarize, SEASAT will not be able 
to measure
 
every useful ice parameter but it will be able to supply 
a
 
great deal of valuable information. Because it can see
 
through clouds with good resdlution, the SAR is probably the
 
best single instrument for ice monitoring. This puts SEASAT
 
in a unique position among currently planned satellites to
 
make a major contribution to an ice reconnaissance system
 
for Arctic shipping.
 
4.4.2 The Exclusive Contribution of SEASAT
 
SEASAT sensor technology, primarily the SAR, pro­
vides radar imagery of the ice region.
 
The quality both of the imagery and of its dissem­
ination to all tankers involved, in all types of operating
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weather, will evidently determine the importance of SEASAT in
 
facilitating transits through the ice of the Northwest Passage.
 
This transit is indicated approximately on the map, Figure 4.6.
 
While SAR ice data interpretation is today somewhat
 
devoid of quantitative results, it can be expected that this
 
condition will have improved considerably by 1985,. with the
 
results of an active program of aircraft experimentation and
 
the analysis of data from SEASAT-A.
 
Navigation of the: tankers requires avoidance of
 
pressure ridges and polar or multi-year ice. A pressure
 
ridge can extend for more than 100 miles and be from 5 to 10
 
miles across with a thickness of up to 147 feet, Polar ice
 
is such that a thickness of 3 feet of it will stop most current
 
ice-breakers. It can be up to 12 feet thick. Hence, the
 
imagery could be very significant in identifying regions to
 
stay away from although ice thickness which is not available
 
would seem to be an important parameter. Each ship of a given
 
weight and power will presumably have an ice penetration
 
thickness beyond which it can be expected to have difficulty.
 
The Arctic polar'basin pack ice is perennial, occupy­
ing almost all the space between the North Pole and the North
 
American and Eurasian coasts. The ice area is a minimum in
 
August with a diameter of about 1900 miles and is a maximum in
 
February with a diameter of about 2500 miles. Closings and
 
openings of the pack ice are induced by wind stress and ocean
 
currents, leads occurring when the ice is open.
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Ship transit delays are assumed to occur when a ship's
 
forward progress is arrested by ice that it cannot penetrate,
 
or by slush or pancakes which pile up to prevent ship forward
 
motion.
 
The ships under discussion, approximately 250,000 dwt
 
tankers, evidently have a great advantage in terms of momentum
 
but they are not particularly maneuverable. This implies that
 
an error in knowledge of ice thickness could result in a ship
 
becoming well entangled with the ice.
 
Actual experience in navigating through Arctic polar
 
ice is very limited, and a great deal needs to be learned to
 
relate delaying ice conditions to the characteristics of the
 
design of ships.
 
For completeness, in this case study an estimate of
 
SEASAT's exclusive contribution to solving Arctic ice naviga­
tional problems to minimize transit delays is required, and
 
subsequently, a judgmental estimate is made.
 
Ice leads would be most likely in the current ice­
breaking season from June to November. In the other six months
 
of the year ice thickness of new ice would be important to know.
 
New ice can be 6 to 10 feet thick.
 
Navigational assistance must take into consideration
 
ice drift, a movement of 0.3 to 0.5 knots under the influence
 
of dominant winds, to satisfy navigational passage prediction,
 
and some appropriate data can be provided by the SAR.
 
Assuming that ice imagery from the SAR during the
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period before 1985 will be the subfect of study and experimen­
tation which will clarify the interpretation of the utility of
 
the ice imagery to navigation, and that dissemination of this
 
data will be adequate, a judgmental estimate will be made of
 
the operational SEASAT's exclusive contribution to the benefits.
 
The following assumptions will be made:
 
Characteristics 	 Weight
 
1. e 	 leads can always be identified
 
o 	 leads are useful 50% of the year
 
o 	 travel in leads occurs 45% of the
 
time in the summer season 0.450
 
* 	 thickness of the ice is required
 
55% of the time
 
o 	 SEASAT's indirect thickness measure­
ment capability has a 20% Utility 0.110
 
Seasonal weight 0.56 x 0.5 = 0.28 
2. 	 c in the winter season pressure
 
ridges and polar ice are a pro­
blem and it will be assumed that
 
they can always be located, but 	 0.2
 
thickness is still only a 20%
 
utility for new ice
 
3. 	 o in the winter season it will be
 
assumed also that 15% of the time
 
there is very heavy precipitation
 
which degrades the SAR data.
 
Seasonal weight 0.5 x 0.2 x 0.85 0.08
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For each year, judgmentally, SEASAT can therefore
 
exclusively contribute 0.28 + 0.08 = 0.36 of the total of
 
-any annual benefit calculated.
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5. THE WESTERN ARCTIC CASE STUDY
 
The Western Arctic Case Study is founded on an
 
Arctic Marine Commerce Study carried out by the Arctic 
In­
stitute of North America (AINA) for MARAD, published in
 
August 1973.*
 
The AINA study projects an East Coast demand for
 
Alaskan oil 
at 450 million barrels per year by 1985 and 792
 
million barrels per year by 2000. 
 With an assumed linear
 
growth the integrated demand for oil between 
1992 and 2000
 
is 6.3 billion barrels. It is not expected that this demand
 
could be satisfied by Arctic discoveries until 1992. Between
 
1985 and 1992, presumably, the demand would be satisfied by oil
 
imports. In 1973 oil imports amounted to 1.184 billion bar­
rels.
 
Current U.S. reserves to production ratio are about
 
11:1 which is low compared to a more usual ratio of about 30:1.
 
Thus, the projected production must be supported by approximate
 
discovered reserves 
of from 8 billion barrels to 21 billion
 
barrels.
 
After study, the AINA report envisages, from compar­
ative transportation analysis, that tanker transport via
 
Arctic Institute of North America, Arctic Marine
 
Commerce Study. Prepared for the U.S. Maritime Admin­
istration, August 1973. 
 NTIS report numbers COM-73­
12001, 12002, 12003.
 
Statistical Abstract, No. 856, pp. 5, 6.
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the Northwest Passage will be the least expensive mode of
 
moving North Slope oil 
to the East Coast, compared to a Trans-

Canada to U.S. pipeline, The AINA study indicates that 245,000
 
dwt Arctic tankers can be operated for this transit each with
 
a capacity of about 
1.6 million barrels. The study envisages
 
a fleet of from 21 to 33 
such tankers depending on whether or
 
not there will be trans-shipment of oil. 
 With these assumptions
 
for this projected operation the total number of laden and
 
empty transits is estimated to be 7900, over the years 1992 to
 
2000. Each such transit will be facilitated by useful ice lead
 
navigational information. With something on the order of 2.4
 
voyages per day as 
the traffic volume, considerable logistic
 
support is visualized for the operation so 
that the operational
 
SEASAT ice lead sensing is 
only one part of the total contribu­
tion to the operations activities.
 
Bearing in mind the conjectural nature of this opera­
tion and that for the near future the principle unknowns in
 
Arctic oil are 
the rates at which money, men and materials can
 
be made available for the necessary exploration and development
 
and that for the distant future the principle question is how
 
much of a production effort can the potential oil 
reserves
 
support, there is a large measure of uncertainty compounded by
 
the now diminished tax incentives and an uncertain oil and gas
 
import policy, The timing with which, such 
an operation could
 
come into being seems very, reasonable, both from a technology
 
development point of view and the general expectation of the
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difficulty of finding, developing and producing recoverable
 
Arctic oil. Figure 5,1 is from the AINA report and represents
 
a consensus of expert opinion relating to Arctic marine commerce
 
technology development. Also shown in this figure are the
 
launch dates for SEASAT-A (1918) , and the date of the operation­
al SEASAT program (1985) used in this economic assessment. The
 
relationship between the SEASAT dates and the development of
 
the Arctic transportation capability is apparent. If the de­
velopment of the Arctic resources and transportation occurs
 
on or near the schedule shown, it is important that the capa­
bility to improve ice and weather forecasting in the Arctic
 
regions occur on a somewhat matching schedule. In order to be
 
conservative, the benefits from operational SEASAT data to the
 
transportation of Arctic resources are considered to commence
 
in 1992. As shown in Figure 5.1, there are significant bene­
fits associated with exploration, development and production
 
that can occur in the period from 1985 to 1992.
 
The last event to occur in this consensus is the
 
opening of a polar shipping route and, as previously stated,
 
this time is reasonably consistent with the possibility of
 
producing Arctic oil, so that the tanker shipment could occur
 
at that time if the required tanker fleet was available.
 
In summary, the case study parameters appear to be
 
reasonable. Based upon oil deposit estimates and preliminary
 
findings, there is evidently sufficient oil to be recovered
 
to provide the reserves appropriate to the postulated pro­
Polar Shipping 
Route Open 
Is Stlbmarine Tanker 
?EEARCII I DEVELO PMENT 
Arctic LNG Ships 1st Arctic OffshoreSoperational 	 Terminal Constructed
 
Unitized Shipping
 
in Arctic Region -D
 
I 
Arctic Ore Carriers- _
 
in Operazion
 
Arctic Tankers
 
in Operation
 
Technically Feasible
 to Construct Arctic
 
Offshore Terminal Operational SEASAT
 
I/ SEASAT-A 
1973 74 75 	 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Research and Experimental Rapid Development Steady Growth
 
Development
 
Figure 5.1 	 Technology Forecast for Arctic Offshore Activities with SEASAT 
Schedule Superimposed. Vertical Axis in Arbitrary Units. 0 
(From Arctic Marine Commerce Study. Written by: AINA, 
Sponsored by: Maritime Administration, 1973) 
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duction. It is not necessarily evident that the oil quantities
 
postulated will originate in the Alaskan North Slope region
 
onshore but it seems reasonable to postulate that they can
 
originate in the Arctic regions in general. This is so in
 
spite of the fact that there is much upsurge in exploratory
 
drilling in offshore Alaska.*
 
The time at which production could occur, i.e., 1992
 
and later, seems to be in reasonable accord with estimates
 
that can be made to develop the expertise in producing onshore
 
and offshore oil in the Arctic regions, within the complexity
 
of the technology and its applications. Transportation of
 
produced oil remains a subject of considerable controversy.
 
Pipelines are recognized as inexpensive, efficient and poten­
tially environmentally sound means for moving both liquid and­
gaseous hydrocarbons. Delays are to be expected and scrutiny
 
will be thorough to show that they are both environmentally
 
safe and economically viable. Their capacity can reasonably
 
be designed to be sufficient to handle anticipated increases
 
in domestic production. Tankers operating in the dangerous
 
waters of the Northwest Passage presumably can also be econom­
ically viable. However, with large amounts of traffic,
 
accidents and oil spills can be expected which present
 
specialized difficulties in the ice environment ranging from
 
routine in open water to next to technologically impossible
 
offshore, March 1975, p. 110.
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if oil is absorbed by the ice or locked into growing ice.*
 
U.S. energy conservation measures can be expected
 
to reach fruition by 1985, if current policies and actions
 
are maintained. It is considered that oil and gas will con­
tinue to supply a major part of the energy needs of the
 
United States through 2000 as a result of the lead time need­
ed to plan, organize, construct, and put into operation al­
ternate sources of energy. Beyond this time, rising demand
 
and alternate sources make it very difficult to forecast a
 
supply need on the U.S. East Coast for Alaskan oil.
 
Major amounts of capital investment will be requir­
ed to reverse current declines in domestic production. Where­
as, in the United States capital requires per well was about
 
$100,00.0, North Slope development will be in the millions of
 
dollars per well. Offshore production will cost tens or hun­
dreds of millions of dollars. The drilling rate required
 
must also increase in proportion to advancing consumption,
 
and in the hostile Arctic environment specialized drilling
 
equipment is needed, as is specialized production equipment.
 
Specialized experimental equipment such as an ice cutting rig
 
and under-sea ice diving apparatus is being tested by the oil
 
companies.**
 
Offshore, March 1975, p. 133.
 
** 
Offshore, January 1975, p. 33 and March
 
1975, p. 109.
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Derivation of Western Arctic Benefits
 
During the nine years of operation from 1992 to
 
2000, the ice-breaking tankers will complete 7900 transits
 
by the Northwest Passage in moving oil from the Arctic oil
 
sources to the East Coast.
 
SEASAT data is postulated as being able to contribute
 
to a reduction of each transit by a given amount of time which,
 
on the basis of daily operating costs, will reduce the oil
 
transportation costs accordingly. SEASAT instrumentation will
 
be capable of detecting leads in the ice to facilitate navi­
gation through forecasting of their position.
 
The benefit parameters to be considered are the
 
following:
 
1. expected tanker daily operating costs
 
2. the number of transit days per transit that can
 
be saved through ice lead navigation
 
3. the amount of oil that will actually be shipped
 
(from 1992 to 2000).
 
Citing these parameters only assumes that the choice of a
 
245,000 dwt tanker for this application, including its loading
 
and unloading requirements as an integrated operation, is most
 
economical irrespective of the hull structure and the ice­
breaking capacity.
 
Tanker construction costs vary greatly with the type
 
of vessel and where it is constructed. Offshore, March 1975,
 
p. 13, quoted a contract for two 150,000 dwt tankers that will
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cost more than $120 million. The SEASAT preliminary economic
 
assessment, October 1974, p. 5-5, quotes costs for three
 
-225,000 dwt tankers whose construction will cost between $57.3
 
million and $70.6 million by the time they are completed in
 
1976. Employing a rule of thumb that daily operating costs
 
are about 1/10 of 1 percent of the capital costs would indi­
cate daily operating costs for a 245,000 dwt tanker to be in
 
the range of $57,000 to $71,000. The range considered for
 
benefit estimates will be $50,000 to $75,000 per day.
 
Expert opinion from experienced ship captains, who
 
have commanded in the Arctic, is that better ice condition in­
formation could reduce transit times by 25 percent.* The
 
Northwest Passage transit is typically variable from 30 to 10
 
or 11 days depending on the time of year. Thus, improved ice
 
condition information would save.from 2.5 to 7.5 days for each
 
transit.
 
Ice condition information improvement can therefore
 
provide cost savings or benefits varying from $125,000 to
 
$562,500 per transit, not all of which can be allocated to
 
SEASAT.
 
It is difficult to foresee what the minimum amount
 
of oil that would be shipped from the American Arctic to the
 
East Coast would be between 1992 and 2000.
 
Clough, D. J., and A. K. McQuillan, "Economic Benefits
 
of Sea Ice Remote Sensing Systems." Submitted to INFOR
 
Journal, January 3, 1974, Revised April 4, 1974.
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It is currently estimated that when all parameters
 
are considered, it is economically viable to produce from a
 
reserve of 5 billion barrels. The annual production from such
 
a reserve would be from 5/11 billion barrels to 5/30 billion
 
barrels depending on the reserve to production ratio. Thus,
 
a minimum production would vary from 0.46 billion barrels per
 
annum to 0.17 billion barrels per annum so that the total
 
shipment over nine years would vary from 1.53 billion barrels
 
to 4.14 billion barrels. The 1.53 billion barrels of oil is
 
estimated as a minimum for pipeline shipment because of the
 
transportation capital and operating costs associated with the
 
estimated 5 billion barrels of a viable economic reserve. It
 
is unknown at this time if this estimated minimum for pipeline
 
transit will also apply for tanker shipment, particularly one
 
that could be subsidized.
 
It will be assumed as reasonable, however, that the
 
total oil shipment from the Arctic to the East Coast would be
 
between 1.5 and 6.3 billion barrels. On the average then, the
 
number of annual transits would vary between 209 and 878.
 
The annual benefits to such an operation would then
 
vary from
 
209 x $125,000 = $ 26,13 million
 
to 878 x $562,500 = $493.88 million
 
over the time interval from 1992 to 2000. This is a range of
 
about 18.9:1 as a consequence of 0.57 to 2.41 transits per day
 
and the variable daily operating costs of the tankers.
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5.2 Integrated Benefits Exclusive to SEASAT
 
5.3 Western Arctic Benefits
 
The annual benefit range exclusive to SEASAT from
 
ice reconnaissance through the Northwest Arctic Passage is
 
estimated to range from $9.4 million to 
$177.8 million, i.e.,
 
36 percent of the previously estimated benefit range, for the
 
years from 1992 to 2000. These are benefits to an operational
 
SEASAT. These benefits will be integrated at their present
 
value in 1975 dollars by discounting back to the beginning
 
of 1975. The benefit in 1992 is assumed to be available at
 
the end of 1992, i.e., after 18 years and the benefit from
 
2000 is available after 26 years.
 
The integrated benefits exclusive to SEASAT are
 
identified in the following table as a function of discount
 
rate, factors for which are quoted.
 
Discount rate 
% 0 5 10 15
 
Factor 9 3.098 1.139 0.443
 
SEASAT exclusive
 
integrated
 
benefit range 88-1600 29-551 11-203 4-79
 
$1975
 
($millions)
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6. THE EASTERN ARCTIC CASE STUDY
 
The Canada Centre for Remote Sensing has studied
 
the problem of petroleum resource shipments from the
 
Canadian Arctic eastward through the Northwest Arctic
 
Passage.
 
The resources to be shipped are oil, liquified
 
natural gas and hydrocarbons, all by appropriate tankers.
 
The oil tankers have an assumed tonnage of 250,000 dwt al­
though water depths in the Prince of Wales Strait might be
 
considered too shallow for a ship of this size. Class 6
 
ice-breaking tankers are used in the Baffin Bay-Lancaster
 
Sound region and Class 8 for the Arctic Islands and the West­
ern Arctic. Their daily operating costs are estimated to
 
be $77,000 and $85,000 respectively, increased by 20 per­
cent from their 1972 values. Liquified natural gas and
 
other hydrocarbons are moved in a Class 6 LNG tanker carry­
ing 0.1 million cubic meters of LNG which has a daily opera­
ting cost of $89,000 and a Class 8, 250,000 dwt tanker
 
at $85,000 per day for other petroleum products. These
 
are thought to be suitable carriers for these resources.
 
Production from various sources, as quoted in
 
Table 6.1, are consistent with 1974 projections of the
 
Alberta Energy Resources Commission.* In Table 6.1, data
 
* 
"Alberta Board's Brief Predicts End to Importing of
 
Oil," The Leader-Post, Regina, April 5, 1974.
 
Table 6.1 Eastorn Actic Bonofit Dovelopment 
Resource 
Lcation Resource 
Annuall Produlctlon 
1900 2000 
Nuinbr 
1900 
Of Transits 
2000 
Dy Saved 
Per Tranait 
Days Saved 
Par A num 
1990 2000 
Ship Daily 
OporAtI Costs 
Gross Annual Benefit 
($ millions) 
1990 2000 
Average Annual Benofit 
$ illion) 
Baffin Bay 
Davis Sar Oil 
256 
Als 
365 
obls 292 140 0.5 146 209 77000 11.2 16.1 13.7 
Arctic 
Islands oil 
91 
ti. 
219 
rSlo 104 250 1.5 156 J75 85000 13.3 31.9 22.6 
Beaufort 
Soa oil 
237 
rils 
430 
nb's 272 500 2.5 600 1250 05000 57.0 106.3 82.1 
Arctic 
island. 
s 
gas 
6.0 
a tons/ 
Yr'* 
10.0 
in tons/ 
Yr 240 400 1.0 240 400 89000 21.4 35.6 20.5 
Arctic 
Islands 
hydro-
carbons 
3.0 
n tons/ 
yr 
6.0 
n tonal 
yr 24 40 1.5 36 72 05000 3.1 6.2 4.7 
151.6 Total 
Annual 
Average 
Bonefit 
69.5 Total 
Annual 
Avot.ao 
Benofit 
al. million barrels 
**atons/yr . million ton, pe yor 
______ ____ ___________________  
_______________Sea Boaufort 0il 
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is established from which benefits 
are computed and presented.
 
6.1 Alternate Sources of Benefits Not Considered
 
No benefits have been included for shipping oil
 
and gas from the offshore East Coast-Labrador Sea areas
 
to east refineries. The projected production of 1.06 million
 
barrels of oil per day in 1990 would require 221, 250,000
 
dwt ship loads per year. The economic benefits would be
 
small compared with those associated with the Arctic ice­
infested waters. Heavy 
seas would not hamper the operation
 
of these tankers and there is little choice of route open
 
to them in any event. Some time savings would result from
 
knowledge of the distribution of icebergs or other obstacles
 
ahead, particularly in fog and in winter while 
ice conditions
 
prevailed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, thus providing faster
 
steering times. Of more importance for both economic and
 
environmental reasons could be storm forecasting allowing
 
better and safer scheduling of loading and unloading oper­
ations.
 
Not included in the benefits presented here but
 
considered in previous studies, 
are those associated with
 
shipment of Mary River iron ore, Strathcona Sound and Little
 
Cornwallis lead/zinc, and reduction of insurance premiums
 
due to improved ice forecasting. These were found* to
 
total more than $10 million annually. Also not included,
 
McQuillan, A. K. and D. J. Clough, "Benefits of Remote
 
Sensing of Sea Ice." Research Report No. 73-3, December
 
1973.
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are benefits associated with inbound shipping and seismic
 
surveys.
 
Benefits from remote sensing assisted improvements
 
in ice and weather forecasting may be largest in promoting
 
safe operations and reducing environmental damage. The
 
risks to wildlife are great in areas such as the Beaufort
 
Sea and in Lancaster Sound where drilling will be done in
 
2500 feet of water.
 
6.2 Integrated Benefits Exclusive to SEASAT
 
The average annual benefits derived in Table 6.1
 
are aggregated from 1990 to 2000. The aggregated benefits
 
over this period are discounted at the beginning of 1975.
 
That is, 1990 benefits are discounted for 16 years and
 
2000 benefits are discounted for 26 years.
 
The aggregated benefits are tabulated in Table
 
6.2, as a function of discount rate with the aggregated
 
discounted factors noted.
 
The benefits exclusive to SEASAT are based, as
 
previously, on an estimated 36 percent contribution allo­
cation to the factors provided by SEASAT's instrumentation.
 
On the average, the amount of oil to be shipped
 
from Canadian Arctic sources is 803 million barrels per
 
annum over the ten-year period. For such a shipment from
 
production, the recoverable estimated reserves discovered
 
would have to lie between 8.83 billion barrels and 24.09
 
billion barrels, based on reserves to production ratios
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Table 6.2 Eastern Arctic Integrated Benefits
 
Discount percentage 0% 5% 10% 15%
 
Discount factor i0 3.9954 1.5547 0.6426
 
Integrated benefits
 
($ millions) 1520 607 236 98
 
Integrated benefits
 
less Beaufort Sea
 
benefits* 700 280 109 45
 
($ millions)
 
Integrated benefits
 
exclusive to SEASAT 547 219 
 85 35
 
($ millions)
 
Integrated benefits
 
less Beaufort Sea
 
benefits exclusive
 
to SEASAT* 252 101 
 39 16
 
( millions)
 
*Beaufort Sea benefits may not be realized because of multi­
year ice and ecological factors. The benefits are, however,
 
included in the integrated benefits.
 
lying between 11 and 30:1. Some 72 billion barrels of 
oil
 
are estimated to 
exist in these regions which implies discovery
 
to 

oil by 1982-1985 depending on the estimated time from discovery
 
to production, in the Arctic 

of 12.3 percent 33.5 percent of the currently undiscovered
 
Islands this requirement, at the
 
lower ratio of reserves to production, would be consistent with
 
the Imperial Oil Ltd. estimate of a 2 billion barrel find but
 
not at the higher ratio. 
 There would not be this consistency
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for the Beaufort Sea production or for the Baffin Bay-Davis
 
Strait region production. It is not unreasonable to assume,
 
however, that oil needs in Canada may diminish the importance
 
of these,
 
7. COMBINED BENEFITS
 
The hypothetical operations that have formed the
 
basis of the case studies presented could possibly both
 
occur together.
 
This is that oil and gas development may evolve
 
in the Alaskan North Slope, the Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie
 
Delta, the Arctic Islands and the Baffin Bay-Davis Strait
 
regions to give-production quantities from all these regions
 
that would be transported eastward for consumption.
 
Such an eventuality, with tankers employed for
 
all shipments through the Arctic Northwest Passage, would
 
result in the benefits of both case studies being arith­
metically combined.
 
The combined, integrated, discounted benefits
 
exclusive to SEASAT would then be as shown below, including
 
Beaufort Sea oil.
 
Discount rate % 0 5 10 15
 
SEASAT exclusive
 
integrated benefit 635-2147 248-770 96-228 39-114
 
range ($ million.)
 
